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AVOIDING MORAL BANKRUPTCY
DAVID A. SKEEL, JR.*
Abstract: Faced with hundreds of clergy sexual misconduct cases last
year, the Archdiocese of Boston hinted that it was considering filing for
bankruptcy. Although it is hard to imagine an archdiocese or church
filing for bankruptcy, bankruptcy has become an important forum for
many social issues that cannot be easily resolved elsewhere. This Article
explores the implications of a religious organization bankruptcy filing
by focusing on four problems with the bankruptcy alternative: the
possibility of dismissal for being filed in bad faith; the question of what
church assets are subject to the process; the fact that the church might
be subject to intrusive scrutiny; and the moral implications. Although
these concerns suggest that a religious organization should file for
bankruptcy only as a last resort, this Article concludes that, in some
circumstances, a bankruptcy filing may be appropriate.
Is bankruptcy always the answer? This may seem like an odd
question with which to begin a discussion on clergy sexual misconduct
and religious liberty. Indeed, as the number of cases involving priests
in the Archdiocese of Boston mushroomed last year, the rumors that
the Archdiocese was considering filing for bankruptcy took me—and
I suspect most bankruptcy scholars—completely by surprise. It had
never dawned on me that a religious organization would ever file for
bankruptcy.
But perhaps it should have. In the past two decades, bankruptcy
has become the forum of choice for resolving social issues that can't
easily be handled elsewhere, particularly when these issues give rise to
widespread litigation. Think of asbestos liability. In 1982, when Johns
Manville was facing an average of three new asbestos lawsuits every
hour (and over 16,500 overall), it filed for bankruptcy in the hope of
getting its litigation crisis under control.' Since then, dozens of ashes-
* Professor of Layv, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am grateful to Mark
Chopko, Bruce Marken, David Novak, Pat Schultz, and participants at The Impact of Clergy
Sexual Misconduct Litigation on Religious Liberty Symposium on April 4, 2003 at Boston
College Law School for helpful comments on earlier drafts; and to Michael Sherman for
research assistance. Special thanks to Jo Ann Brighton for extensive discussions (and de-
bates) about these issues.
For discussion, see, for example, awn) A. SKEEI„ JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY
OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 217 (2001) (quoting KEVIN j..DELANEY, STRATEGIC
1181
1182	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 44:1181
tos manufacturers, as well as numerous companies whose asbestos in-
volvement was less direct, have filed for bankruptcy. In theory, the
wave of asbestos liability could have been dealt with in other ways. Yet,
none of the most likely suspects—consolidating many or all of the
cases against any given company into a single class-action lawsuit, for
instance, or appointing a special judicial panel to hear all of the
cases—has proven adequate to the task. 2 Although companies obvi-
ously would rather avoid bankruptcy if they can, bankruptcy courts
have developed mechanisms for compensating the victims without
destroying the enterprise from which the compensation must come. 3
In the asbestos cases, courts have set up trusts that are funded with
much of the value of the company, and the same strategy has been
used in other cases that were prompted by an avalanche of litigation.
For example, trusts were set up to compensate victims of the Dalkon
Shield intrauterine contraceptive device and for the thousands of
cases involving Dow Corning's silicon breast implants. 4
Another industry using bankruptcy to resolve social issues is the
steel industry. A central issue in the steel industry today is how to bal-
ance the steel companies' promises in the past to make generous re-
tirement payments to their employees with the need to minimize the
companies' costs in the fiercely competitive global steel markets of
today. Once again, this tension is being resolved in the bankruptcy
courts, where much of the industry is currently doing business.5
Although asbestos manufacturers and steel companies are both
large, for-profit businesses, bankruptcy is not limited to the for-profit
world. When Orange County, California faced fiscal ruin in the 1990s
after Robert Citron, the county's treasurer, lost millions of dollars of
the county's money gambling on financial derivatives, it invoked a sec-
tion of the bankruptcy laws that is designed for municipalities. 6 The
bankruptcy laws also explicitly contemplate that ordinary nonprofit
BANKRUPTCY: How CORPORATIONS AND CREDITORS USE CHAPTER 11 TO THEIR ADVAN-
TAGE 60-61 (1992)).
2
 Congress is currently considering legislation that would put statutory limits on asbes-
tos claims, but it remains unclear whether the legislation will be enacted. See Fairness in
Asbestos Injury Resolution Act, S. 1125, 108th Cong. (2003).
SKEEL, supra note 1, at 217-21.
Id. at 217-18.
5
 See, e.g., Howard Brod Brownstein, Bethlehem Steel; Death in the Family, Pfm.A. IN-
QUIRER, May 4, 2003, http://www.nhcteam.com/deatkinfamily.html
 ("Some two dozen
American steelmakers have now gone bankrupt since 1998.").
6
 Orange County filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 9. For a description of the Or-
ange County crisis, see Peter H. Huang et al., Derivatives on TV: A Tale of Two Derivatives
Debacles in Prime-Time, 4 GREEN BAG 213 257, 259-60 (2001).
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companies may file for bankruptcy, and many of them have clone just
this over the years.
Now, there is an obvious difference between churches and the
denizens of the bankruptcy courts that I have just mentioned. The
role of the church is moral, not economic. Religious organizations
cannot avoid economic issues—more money, after all, usually means
more ministry—but economic issues are decidedly secondary.? The
mission statement of the church I belong to, for instance, describes
the church's priorities as providing sound biblical teaching and loving
pastoral care. Reaching out to the needy is another central concern;
this is a characteristic that churches share with many other nonprofits,
and to some extent with cities. None of these entities, however, is as
pervasively and irreducibly moral as churches.
I suspect this is why the response to the Archdiocese of Boston's
suggestion it might be forced to file for bankruptcy was so unremit-
tingly hostile. Shortly after Cardinal Bernard Law resigned, Alan
Wolfe summed up the general consensus. 8
 The next leader, Wolfe
wrote, will, If he has any sense, back down from the bankrupt notion
of declaring bankruptcy." 9
There are a lot of reasons why the Archdiocese of Boston, or
other churches that face analogous crises in the future, should hesi-
tate to invoke the bankruptcy laws. I will spend much of this Article
exploring four obvious problems with the bankruptcy alternative: the
possibility that the case would get kicked out as having been filed in
bad faith;") the question of what church assets would get pulled into
the bankruptcy process;" the fact that the church might be subject to
intrusive and unwelcome scrutiny in bankruptcy;" and the moral im-
plications of a bankruptcy filing. 13
Despite these obstacles, I will argue in the end that bankruptcy is
entirely defensible for a religious organization in some circumstances;
7 For fascinating accounts of the role of money in evangelical ministry, see Got) AND
MAMMON: PROTESTANTS, MONEY, AND THE MARKET, 1790-1860 (Mark A. Nol! ed., 2002)
and MORE MONEY, MORE MINISTRY (Larry Eskridge & Mark A. Noll eds., 2000).
8
 Alan Wolfe is the director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life
at Boston College.
° Alan Wolfe, The Men Who Disappeared, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 22, 2002, at DI, available
at http://www.boston.com/globeispotligh Vabuse/stories4/122202_,wolfe.htm.
I° See infra Part I.
II See infra Part II.
12 See infra Part III.
' 3 Sec infra Part IV.
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it may even prove to be the most sensible solution." Bankruptcy
would be morally bankrupt, as Wolfe suggested, if a church used it to
evade its obligations to the victims of clergy sexual misconduct. 15
 But
this isn't the only way that the bankruptcy process can be used.
I. GOOD OR BAD FAITH?
The first question is whether churches or other religious organi-
zations are even permitted to file for bankruptcy. If American bank-
ruptcy law excluded religious organizations, the debate as to whether
bankruptcy is an appropriate solution would never get off the ground.
But bankruptcy law itself is easily capacious enough to encompass
churches and other religious organizations. As we shall see, this does
not necessarily mean that any church could file for bankruptcy if it
wished to do so. The point is simply that religious organizations meet
the literal requirements for filing a bankruptcy petition, the "letter" of
the bankruptcy law.
Here is how it works. With a few exceptions, any "person" is enti-
tled to invoke Chapter 11, the principal reorganization provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code. 16
 "Person," of course, includes far more than
men, women and children. In the inimitable way of the law, nearly any
individual, partnership, or corporation qualifies as - a "person."17 The
question, then, is whether an archdiocese or church fits within any of
these categories. The answer will almost always be "yes." Most
churches are organized as nonprofit corporations of one form or an-
other, and the bankruptcy laws make clear that "corporation" should
be construed quite broadly. The term includes nonprofits as well as
for-profit corporations. In fact, even entities that are not technically
corporations, such as an "unincorporated company or association,"
are treated as corporations for the purposes of bankruptcy law. 18
The Archdiocese of Boston is a good illustration. The Archdio-
cese is structured as a "corporation sole"—an ecclesiastical corpora-
tion that is controlled by a single individual, in this case the cardinal
14 See infra Part V.
18 See Wolfe, supra note 9, at DI.
16 11 U.S.C. g 109 (2000). The 'persons" who cannot file for Chapter 11 include
stockbrokers, who can file for Chapter 7 (which provides for liquidation rather than reor-
ganization) but not Chapter 11, and banks and insurance companies, which have their
own, separate regulatory structures and are therefore excluded from both Chapter 7 and
Chapter 11. Id.
17 Id. § 101(91) (defining "person") .
§ 101(9) (defining  "corporation') .
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overseeing the Archdiocese.i° There is no question that the Archdio-
cese meets the technical, statutory requirements for filing a bank-
ruptcy petition.
Notice what the bankruptcy law does not require. It does not re-
quire debtors to demonstrate that they are insolvent when they file for
bankruptcy.20 Under the old Bankruptcy Act, which was replaced by
the current Bankruptcy Code in 1978, an entity that wished to file for
bankruptcy generally had to demonstrate that its liabilities exceeded
its assets. 21 No more. The drafters of the current Code deliberately
omitted the insolvency requirement. In theory, at least, a financially
healthy debtor can file for bankruptcy if it so chooses.
The reality, however, is a bit more complicated. Although the
statutory prerequisites for filing for bankruptcy are quite limited,
courts have long hesitated to make bankruptcy available to debtors
that do not seem to belong there. If a debtor files for bankruptcy for
reasons other than a genuine need to restructure its debts, courts
sometimes conclude that the case has not been filed in good faith and
kick it out. 22 It is this implied duty of good faith that raises the first
serious question concerning the Archdiocese of Boston's hint that it
might file for bankruptcy.
The question posed by a series of high profile cases—including
Continental Airlines' decision to file for bankruptcy largely to termi-
nate its collective bargaining agreement in 1984 and the use of bank-
ruptcy by Johns Manville and other asbestos manufacturers to con-
solidate their defense to litigation by tort victims—was whether
companies were violating the good faith obligation by filing for bank-
15 Nearly every state has a statute authorizing the formation of a corporation sole and
vesting decision-making authority in the head of the religious organization in question.
For a useful description and analysis of one state's corporation sole provisions, see UTAII
DIV. Or CORPS. AND COMMERCIAL CODE, CORPORATION SOLE: How to INCORPORATE
(2002), at http://wwwcommerce.utah.gov.
" See, e.g., Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Kit ippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing
Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 919, 921 n.7 ("Con-
spicuous by its absence from the Bankruptcy Code is any requirement that the debtor be
insolvent in either an equity or balance sheet sense.").
21 Id.
22
 The principal statutory basis for dismissing a bankruptcy petition on good faith
grounds is 11 U.S.C. 1112(6), which authorizes the bankruptcy court to dismiss a case
"for cause." Section 1112(b) gives a laundry list of bases for dismissal, including factors
such as the absence of a reasonable likelihood of reorganization. Lack of good faith is not
listed, but some courts have deemed it an implicit requirement; see also 11 U.S.C. § 305
(authorizing bankruptcy court to dismiss a case if the interests of creditors and the debtor
would be better served by such dismissal or suspension").
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ruptcy solely for strategic advantage. 23 In each of these cases, the
court permitted the case to go forward. More recently, however, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in In re SGL Car-
bon corp. did not. 24 As we shall see, SGL Carbon sheds significant light
on the implications of an archdiocese bankruptcy filing.
SGL Carbon involved a manufacturer of graphite electrodes that
had been accused of price fixing by numerous steel producers who
purchased the electrodes for use in the production of stee1. 25 A group
of the lawsuits were consolidated into a single class action, but many
of the members of the intended class action opted out in order to file
their own, separate antitrust lawsuits. In the face of this wave of litiga-
tion, the impact of which was initially estimated by the company itself
at $240 million, SGL Carbon filed for bankruptcy on December 16,
1998. The next day, SGL Carbon issued a press release announcing
that it had filed for bankruptcy "to protect itself against excessive de-
mands made by plaintiffs in civil antitrust litigation and in order to
achieve an expeditious resolution of the claims against it." The press
release emphasized that "SGL Carbon Corporation is financially
healthy." "If we did not face [antitrust] claims for such excessive
amounts," the missive explained, "we would not have had to file for
Chapter 11."
The similarities between SGL Carbon's and the Archdiocese of
Boston's predicaments are striking. In each case, the crisis stemmed
from the prospect of enormous liability from lawsuits filed against an
otherwise financially healthy entity. Were it not for this litigation—
litigation based in each instance on alleged misbehavior involving the
would-be debtor itself—the prospect of bankruptcy would never have
arisen. 2° The question in each instance is whether the "distractions" of
" See generally In reJohns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984): ht re Con-
tinental Airlines Corp., 38 B.R. 67 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984). For a thorough discussion of
the cases, see Ponoroff & Kn ippen berg, supra note 20, at 933-38.
24
 200 F.3d 154, 165-66 (3d Cir. 1999).
25
 The facts discussed below are described at the outset of the SGL Carbon opinion. Id.
at 156-58.
26 Indeed, the clergy sexual misconduct liability could probably not be discharged by
any of the priests themselves if they filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on their own
behalf. Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (6), willful and malicious injuries cannot be discharged
in Chapter 7, although they can be discharged if the individual involved proposes a three-
to five-year rehabilitation plan pursuant to Chapter 13 instead. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 1328.
Because the nondischargability provision applies only to individuals, not to entities, it
would not preclude an archdiocese or church from obtaining a bankruptcy discharge. For
further discussion of the implications of Chapter 13 for individual priests, see infra note
43.
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litigation that "posed a serious threat to [the company's] continued
successful operations," as the District Court put it, and which "could
cause ... financial and operational ruin," are a sufficient basis for in-
voking the bankruptcy laws. 27
In SGL Carbon, the Third Circuit said no. Only if the Chapter 11
petition "serves a valid reorganizational purpose," the court con-
cluded, does it qualify as having been filed in good faith. 28 Filing for
bankruptcy "merely to obtain tactical litigation advantages" does not
meet this standard. The court was particularly troubled by the fact
that SGL Carbon had no financial concerns other than the antitrust
exposure, that it had filed for bankruptcy solely to address the litiga-
tion, and that the company emphasized that bankruptcy would not
interfere with its normal business operations in any way."
SGL Carbon highlights a significant risk to a diocese or archdio-
cese that decides to file for bankruptcy in order to address clergy sex-
ual misconduct litigation. The bankruptcy petition would almost cer-
tainly be challenged by one or more of the tort plaintiffs as having
been filed in bad faith, and the plaintiffs could make the same kinds
of arguments that won the day in SGL Carbon. In some respects, the
arguments for barring the doors of bankruptcy are even stronger with
respect to the Archdiocese of Boston. The Archdiocese appears to
have relatively little debt other than its potential tort liability, for in-
stance, which suggests that a bankruptcy case could be seen as having
no "reorganizational purpose" beyond the Archdiocese's desire to ad-
dress the numerous lawsuits filed by the victims of alleged miscon-
duct.
The risk of dismissal on bad faith grounds is just that—a risk, not
a certainty. As noted earlier, courts have permitted companies to file
for bankruptcy, in a series of prominent cases, despite concerns that
the filing was strategic in nature. The mass tort cases—In re Johns-
Manville Corp. and its peers in the asbestos industry, and the Dalkon
Shield and silicon breast implant cases—all can be seen as fitting this
pattern, as can In re Continental Airlines Corp., although the threat to
the economic viability of these enterprises was more obvious than with
either SGL Carbon or the Archdiocese."
27 SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 162.
28 Id. at 165.
29 Id. at 162-63.
" See, e.g., Johns-Manville, 36 B.R. at 729; Continental Airlines, 38 13.R. at 71. The single
most dramatic example of bankruptcy being used to achieve a litigation objective came in
the Texaco bankruptcy, in which the good faith issue was debated but never formally de-
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The point, then, is this: although nothing in the bankruptcy laws
precludes an archdiocese or church from filing for bankruptcy, a
Chapter 11 petition by the Archdiocese would probably be challenged
on good faith grounds. Given that the Archdiocese is financially
healthy apart from the estimated five hundred clergy sexual miscon-
duct cases filed against it, a bankruptcy court could conclude that the
Archdiocese does not have an a genuine "reorganizational purpose"
and should therefore be kicked out of Chapter 11.
IT. WHAT CHURCH ASSETS MIGHT GET PULLED INTO THE CASE?
Suppose the Archdiocese or other religious organization weath-
ered this initial storm and persuaded the court that it belonged in
bankruptcy. What other concerns might then lie in store?
The second major issue—an issue that has figured prominently
in media accounts of the Archdiocese of Boston's crisis—is what
bankruptcy would mean for the Archdiocese's assets. Media coverage
has raised the specter of tort victims foreclosing on Archdiocese
schools and churches in order to satisfy judgments against the Arch-
diocese." There also are questions as to whether the Archdiocese's
creditors might seek to "pierce the veil" to hold the Vatican responsi-
ble for the Archdiocese's obligations, and as to what effect an Arch-
diocese bankruptcy would have on the liability of individual priests.
Start with the churches and schools. Bankruptcy actually makes
seizure of a church or school less—rather than more—likely. As soon
as a bankruptcy petition is filed, an "automatic stay" goes into effect. 32
The stay prohibits creditors from foreclosing on property or taking
any other step to collect what they are owed." To the extent the
churches and schools were Archdiocese property—an issue about
which there has been some dispute—their value would need to be
taken into account in the Archdiocese's negotiations with its credi-
cided. Texaco was able to reorganize in Chapter 11 even though it was fully solvent and
filed for bankruptcy solely to renegotiate the terms of a $10.53 billion judgment it owed to
Pennzoil after being found liable for interfering with Pennzoil's attempted acquisition of
Getty Oil. See DELANEY, supra note 1, at 144-54; see also Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra
note 20, at 938-39.
3 ' See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Boston Church Pond Will Allow Archdiocese to Weigh Bankruptcy,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2002, at Al, A38 (suggesting that bankruptcy would "giv(e) a judge
control over which church land or buildings might be sold to pay plaintiffs").
" 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000).
33 See id. The automatic stay is commonly described as giving the debtor "relief from its
creditors."
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tors, but the automatic stay would prevent, say, an angry creditor from
seeking to have them seized."
When an ordinary corporation files for bankruptcy, the stay
alone does not provide complete protection against seizure and sale
of the company's assets. If creditors believe that liquidating the com-
pany's property makes more sense than trying to negotiate a restruc-
turing, they can ask the bankruptcy court to convert the case from
Chapter 11—the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code—
to Chapter 7, which provides for liquidation." The Archdiocese, by
contrast, would not face this threat. Because the Archdiocese is a
nonprofit corporation, it would be subject to more favorable treat-
ment under the bankruptcy laws than an ordinary, for-profit business.
Nonprofit corporations cannot be thrown into bankruptcy involuntar-
ily;" and the bankruptcy laws forbid a court from converting a case
filed by a nonprofit from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 unless the non-
profit itself agrees to the conversion." Together, then, bankruptcy's
standstill provision and the protection against being pushed into
Chapter 7 make it. unlikely that a bankruptcy filing would lead to the
forced sale of one of Boston's cathedrals or a parochial school build-
ing."
What about the other parties who have been named in clergy
sexual misconduct litigation—the priests who allegedly abused parish-
ioners, and officials higher up in the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic
Church (the "Church")? Would a bankruptcy filing also shelter them
and their assets? With respect to the priests, bankruptcy would. have
no effect on any criminal prosecutions commenced against them, as
the automatic stay does not. interfere with criminal actions." With
"Although the Archdiocese seems to hold title to the property as a corporation sole,
Church lawyers have hinted that they might contend that the property is actually held in
trust for the parishioners within the Archdiocese, and that the head of the Archdiocese is
simply a trustee for the interests of the parishioners. See, e.g., jusiin Pope, Questions and
Answers About the Boston Archdiocese Chapter II Bankruptcy, Dec. 11, 2002 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
" 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (conversion to Chapter 7 when this is in the best interest of
creditors) .
315
 Id. § 303(a) (excluding nonprofits from involuntary bankruptcy).
s7 Id. § 1112(c).
38 If any of the Archdiocese's churches or schools were subject to a significant mort-
gage, the mortgagee could ask the court to lift the stay in order to permit a foreclosure. Id.
§ 362(d) (providing several bases for lifting the stay, including "cause" and the absence of
equity in property that is not necessary to an effective reorganization). The Archdiocese's
property, however, does not seem to be subject to any substantial mortgages, which makes
this step unlikely.
39 Id. § 362(b){1) (criminal actions not stayed).
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civil litigation, however, things are not quite so simple. Technically,
the bankruptcy stay applies only to the debtor itself and not to third
parties such as officers or employees of the debtor. Courts, however,
have sometimes extended the stay beyond the debtor itself when the
restructuring effort would be derailed in the absence of a more
sweeping standstill. In the most prominent case, in 1986, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in A.H. Robins Co. v.
Piccinin relied heavily on the fact that a single insurance policy cov-
ered both the company and several of its executives, who had also
been sued.40
 If efforts to sue the executives were not enjoined, accord-
ing to the court, the litigation could "reduce and diminish the insur-
ance fund or pool represented in [the insurance policy] and thereby
affect the property of the debtor to the detriment of the debtor's
creditors as a whole." 4 l The insurance rationale carries little water in
the clergy sexual misconduct context, both because the Archdiocese's
coverage was relatively limited and because it would not protect
priests who engaged in intentional misconduct.42 A bankruptcy court
might still bring a halt to litigation against the priests, on the view that
the litigation is so central to resolution of the Archdiocese's financial
difficulties that it should be handled in connection with the bank-
ruptcy case, rather than permitted to go forward. This is the most
sensible conclusion, in my view, but it is far from certain. The court
might well conclude that the arguments for an extended stay are in-
sufficient, and that the individual priests should file for bankruptcy
themselves if it is essential that the litigation against them be put on
hold.°
4° 788 F.2d 994, 1001, 1007-08 (4th Cir. 1986).
41 Id. at 1008.
42
 Although the Archdiocese had roughly $100 million in liability insurance, the
amount of coverage in place in any given year was quite small. See, e.g., Justin Pope, Bank-
ruptcy Wouldn't Solve All Archdiocese Problems, AssocIATED Parrs, Aug. 9, 2002.
43
 The possibility that the priests themselves might file for bankruptcy raises several
additional issues, which are worth briefly noting here. The principal choices for an indi-
vidual who files for bankruptcy are Chapter 7, which provides for an immediate discharge,
and Chapter 13, which contemplates a three- to five-year repayment plan. As noted earlier,
if a priest filed for Chapter 7, lie would not be permitted to discharge any sexual miscon-
duct liability if the liability constituted "willful and malicious injury by the debtor." 11
U.S.C. § 523(a) (6). Under the so-called "superdischarge" of Chapter 13, on the other
hand, even liability for willful and malicious injury can be discharged. Id. § 1328(a). This
would make Chapter 13 the obvious choice. But to invoke Chapter 13, the priest would
need to show that he had "regular income" (which could be difficult unless the church is
paying the priest a salary or pension), and Chapter 13 would not be available if a plaintiff
had already obtained a large judgment. Chapter 13 is only available to debtors who have
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Here, then, is another risk to the Archdiocese in the event it files
for bankruptcy. If the court refuses to stay the litigation against indi-
vidual priests, the Archdiocese would incur all of the downsides of
bankruptcy—including the stigma it could entail—without achieving
one of its important potential benefits—an orderly resolution of the
misconduct litigation.
Another risk of filing for bankruptcy is that creditors would insist
that responsibility for the Archdiocese's obligations extends beyond
the Archdiocese itself. Creditors might argue that the finances of the
Vatican (or, perhaps, other archdioceses) and the Archdiocese are so
closely intertwined that the Vatican should be responsible for all of
the Archdiocese's obligations. There is, of course, a long tradition in
American corporate law of "piercing the corporate veil" when the par-
ties have ignored corporate boundaries, and holding higher-ups re-
sponsible if they clearly are the ones pulling the strings." Based on
this reasoning, the victims of alleged clergy sexual misconduct could
try to pull the Vatican into the case.
It is of course extremely unlikely that the Vatican could be held
responsible for clergy sexual misconduct, no matter how closely inter-
twined its assets are with those of the Archdiocese. The Vatican's sov-
ereign immunity would insulate it from any direct liability. The Vati-
can's immunity would not make the veil-piercing argument irrelevant,
however, Even if the Vatican could not be compelled to contribute
financially to any settlement or judgment, creditors could raise the
issue indirectly. They could point to the absence of a Vatican contri-
bution as evidence that any proposed reorganization plan was not
filed in good faith, and thus should not be confirmed. 45
How serious is the risk that a court would be persuaded to insist
upon a substantial Vatican contribution? Even apart from any First
Amendment concerns, the likelihood that a court would indirectly
pierce the corporate veil seems relatively small. There is much less
financial interdependence between the Vatican and any given diocese
or archdiocese than many observers assume. For instance, the Vatican
less than $807,750 in secured debt and less than $269,250 in unsecured debt. See id.
§ 109(e) (requirements for filing under Chapter 13).
" Recent veil-piercing cases are extensively surveyed in Robert B. Thompson, Piercing
the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991). For a classic defense
of holding the separate parts of a larger enterprise liable for one another's obligations, see
generally Adolph A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of En 'uprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343 (1947).
45
 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (3) ("good faith" requirement for confirmation of reorgani-
zation plan).
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rarely contributes money to an archdiocese; and contributions run-
ning from an archdiocese to the Vatican are slightly more common,
but still extremely limited in scope.° If secular corporations main-
tained this degree of separation, the arguments for holding the par-
ent entity responsible would be viewed as weak. Nevertheless, the risk
that the Vatican would be pulled into the• case—at least indirectly—
cannot be dismissed. This is one more reason that an archdiocese
should think twice before filing for bankruptcy.
III. THE PERILS OF INTRUSIVE BANKRUPTCY SCRUTINY
There's more. A hallmark of Chapter 11 is that it provides for
pervasive court oversight and extensive scrutiny of the entity
throughout the bankruptcy process. An entity that files for bank-
ruptcy is required to submit a list of all of its creditors, as well as "a
schedule of assets and liabilities, a schedule of current income and
current expenditures, and a statement of the debtor's financial af-
fairs."47 And this is only the beginning, the price of admission to
Chapter 11. Chapter 11 debtors and those who run them are required
to provide ongoing information about the entity's finances. Creditors
and other parties in interest are entitled to examine the debtor, its
assets and its officers.° The rationale, of course, is that creditors need
a clear picture of the debtor's financial status to decide what the next
step should be—whether the debtor should be restructured and, if so,
on what terms.
A church or diocese that filed for bankruptcy would thus be re-
quired, as a bankruptcy lawyer recently put it, to "open up all of its
closets and drawers:49
 For the Archdiocese of Boston, this would
mean submitting the records of its schools—teachers' salaries, the
costs of administration, the extent of any subsidies from Church cof-
fers—to public scrutiny. The income and expenses of each of the
Archdiocese's churches would be subject to the same kind of scrutiny.
This policy of full disclosure does not fit easily with the desire of most
religious institutions to keep their inner workings private.
16
 See Rekgion & Ethics Newsweel051: Catholic Church Finances (Thirteen/WNET New York
television broadcast, July 12, 2002), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionanciethics/
week595/feature.html (transcript).
47 11 U.S.C.§521(1).
48 See, e.g., FED. R. BANxx. P. 2004 (authorizing examination, including right to compel
attendance and production of documentary evidence).
48 Telephone interview with Jo Ann Brighton, Partner, Nixon Peabody LLP (Apr. 1,
2003).
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In addition to—and even more invasive than—these disclosure
obligations, Chapter 11 also calls for extensive oversight of nearly
every significant decision made by the debtor. Suppose, for instance,
that an archdiocese wished to start a new school on Church property
in an underserved part of the city. In bankruptcy, the cardinal or
other archdiocese decisionmakers could not make this determination
on their own because bankruptcy requires. court approval of any deci-
sion to "use, sell, or lease" property that is not in the ordinary course
of business." The same strictures would apply to any other major
archdiocese decision. It is not hard to imagine conflicts between
creditors, whose interests may be principally financial, and the spiri-
tual and eleemosynary goals of the archdiocese. What should the
bankruptcy court do if the archdiocese believes that it must expand its
programs for the poor, but creditors resist? Or what if disagreements
arise about the amount of money a church contributes to foreign mis-
sions programs?
The last possible intrusion is the most dramatic of all, and it high-
lights the awkward fit between religious organizations and America's
bankruptcy laws. If the creditors lose confidence in the men and
women who are running a business in Chapter 11, they have the
power to ask the bankruptcy court to replace the managers with a
trustee. "At any time after the commencement of the case," according
to the relevant provision, the bankruptcy court "shall order the ap-
pointment. of a trustee" if there is "cause, including fraud, dishonesty,
incompetence, or gross mismanagement," or "if such appointment is
in the interests of creditors" and other interested parties. 51 To be sure,
there is an obvious Twilight Zone quality to the possibility that a bank-
ruptcy court might oust an archbishop or other Church leader and
put the archdiocese's schools (and in theory, even its churches) in the
hands of a court-appointed trustee. Even apart from any First
Amendment concerns, it seems quite unlikely that a bankruptcy court
would ever agree to inject itself into Church affairs this directly. In-
deed, the creditors' option of calling for a trustee seems to demon-
strate nothing more than that the drafters of Chapter 11 never con-
templated that a religious organization might file for bankruptcy. In
the similarly ticklish context of municipal bankruptcy, the drafters
were quite careful to make clear that the bankruptcy court has no
power to interfere in any way with "any of the political or governmen-
6° 11 U.S.C. § 363(b).
51 Id. § 1104 (emphasis added).
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tal powers of the debtor. "52
 If the drafters had considered the possibil-
ity that an archdiocese might invoke Chapter 11, I suspect they would
have erected a similar wall between the bankruptcy process, on the
one hand, and the internal workings of the Church, on the other.
Still, the facts that bankruptcy courts are unlikely to exercise their os-
tensible authority to appoint a trustee, and that this authority is more
accidental than intended in this context, do not make the possibility
of a trustee irrelevant. Although one would not expect the creditors
of most religious organizations even to threaten to ask for a trustee,
the level of outrage with clergy sexual misconduct is so high that one
can envision one or more of the victims and their lawyers taking this
step.
What about the First Amendment concerns that I alluded to a
moment ago? For a reader with even a passing acquaintance with re-
ligious freedom and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment, each level of scrutiny I have described—the disclosure obliga-
tions, the judicial oversight of financial decisions and, most startlingly,
the possibility of a trustee—raises obvious questions. Would not some
or all of these intrusions be unconstitutional? The most dramatic in-
tervention, replacing church leaders with a trustee, probably would
be, but the answer is much less clear with the other standard forms of
bankruptcy scrutiny. On several different occasions in recent years,
the United States Supreme Court has made clear that bankruptcy is a
privilege, not an entidement. 53
 When individuals or entities file for
bankruptcy, or file pleadings in a bankruptcy case, they waive their
right to insist on many of the protections that might otherwise be
available to them.54
 This reasoning suggests that an archdiocese that
filed for bankruptcy would be required to disclose as much financial
information as any other debtor; and it might also be held to justify
court oversight over major financial decisions made by the archdio-
cese during the course of the bankruptcy case.
In short, a church or archdiocese that filed for bankruptcy
would, by virtue of the filing, be consenting to a significant lowering
of the wall of separation between church and state.
53 Id. § 909(1). This section also prevents the court from interfering with "any of the
property or revenues of the debtor," or "the debtor's use or enjoyment of any income-
producing property." Id. § 904(2)—(3).
53 See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 654 U.S. 278,286 (1991) (citing United States v. liras, 409
U.S. 434,995-46 (1973)).
54 See, e.g., Langenkamp v. Culp, 998 U.S. 42,45 (1990) (creditor who files claim waives
right to a jury trial).
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IV. BANKRUPTCY AS A MORAL ISSUE
Up to this point, I have been careful to downplay as much as pos-
sible the explicitly moral questions as to whether it is, or ever would
be, appropriate for a church or archdiocese to file for bankruptcy.
Eliding these issues is no easy feat, of course, since the bankruptcy
decision is pervasively moral in nature. Moral considerations are the
fourth and most important reason why religious organizations should
think long and hard before filing for Chapter 11.
Although there is a longstanding debate as to the morality of
filing for bankruptcy, the debate has tended to focus on slightly dif-
ferent issues than those at stake in the clergy sexual misconduct con-
text. When an individual encounters financial distress, the question
we usually ask is whether it is appropriate for her to discharge—and
thus fail to pay—the obligations that she has assumed. In my own,
protestant Christian tradition, critics of bankruptcy have emphasized
a smattering of scriptural passages that underscore the importance of
repaying one's debts. The Bible notes that "[t] he wicked borrow and
do not repay," for instance; and the Apostle Paul admonished the
Romans to "Let no debt remain outstanding, except the continuing
obligation to love one another. "55 The usual argument is that a prom-
ise is a promise, and that there is no excuse for failing to honor the
financial commitments we make, 56
Now, whatever one thinks of this debate, it has a slightly different
emphasis than the questions raised by clergy sexual misconduct liabil-
ity. Stripped of its subtleties, debates about bankruptcy morality usu-
ally concern contractual liabilities, debts that a person promised to
pay; here, by contrast, the liability comes from a tort—from misbehav-
ior by priests for which both the priests and the archdiocese are likely
to be responsible. The fact that the liability is imposed by law, rather
than contracted for by the archdiocese, does not mean an archdio-
cese can simply ignore it and file for bankruptcy without a second
thought, of course. But we need to look at it through a slightly differ-
5' Psalms 37:21 ("The wicked borrow ...."); Romans 13:8 ("Let no debt remain ....").
56 The most prominent Christi= financial writers—including Larry Burkett and Ron
Blue—have tended to take this view, suggesting that Christians should never file for bank-
ruptcy. See, e.g., RON BLUE, Tut: DEBT SQUEEZE: How YOUR FAMILY CAN BECOME FINAN-
CIALLY FREE 42-43 (1989) (concluding that borrowers have "no alternative" other than to
repay, and that "[flailing to repay is to violate the command in Psalmis] 37:21"); LARRY
BuRK•rr, DEBT-FREE LIVING 59-60 (1989) (citing Ecclesiastes 5:5 and concluding that bor-
rowers have an absolute commitment to repay).
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era lens.57
 Unlike with contractual obligations, which raise questions
about the nature of one's-promises, the real issue in the clergy sexual
misconduct context is accountability—the accountability of both the
archdiocese and the priests themselves to those who have been
harmed by the horrifying abuses that have been alleged in the litiga-
tion.
The Bible has a great deal to say about accountability—much
more than it says about repaying one's debts, or about almost any
other issue other than salvation. Oppression of the weak and power-
less is and always has been a problem both for churches and in the
secular world. The prophets, the psalmists, and Christ himself re-
turned to this theme again and again. The just king to whom the
psalmist looks, to give just one illustration, 'will take pity on the weak
and the needy and save the needy from death./He will rescue them
from oppression and violence, for precious is their blood in his
sight. "58
It does not take any great insight to apply these admonitions to
our context, the moral implications of a church bankruptcy filing. If a
church's decision to file for bankruptcy meant turning its back on
those who have been harmed, Chapter 11 obviously would fly in the
face of the Bible's teaching on accountability to those who are op-
pressed.
There is another, related concern as well: how would a bank-
ruptcy filing be perceived by those outside the Church? The perceived
"stigma" of bankruptcy dissuades many financially troubled debtors
from filing for bankruptcy.59
 Although the stigma of bankruptcy
seems to have diminished in recent years—this surely is part of the
explanation for the astonishingly high number of bankruptcy
filings88—it has not disappeared altogether. The impact to a religious
57
 For a secular moral argument that it is more defensible to discharge tort obligations
than contractual ones due to the absence of a promise to pay, see generally Philip
Shuchman, An Attempt at a "Philosophy" of Bankruptcy, 21 UCLA L. REV. 403 (1974).
5e Psalms 72:13—:14.
59 See Amanda E. Dawsey & Lawrence M. Ausubel, Informal Bankruptcy (Feb. 2002), at
http://www.ausubel.com/creditcard-papers/informal-bankruptcy.pdf; Michelle J. White,
Why it Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at Incentives Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy
Law and a Proposal for Change, 65 U. Cm. L. REV. 685, 697-99 (1998) (concluding that
many American families could gain financially if they were to file for bankruptcy).
03 The number of bankruptcy filings exceeded one million per year for the first time
in 1996, and it has hovered around 1.5 million the past several years. The numbers seem to
reflect both a decrease in the stigma of filing for bankruptcy and a dramatic increase in
access to credit cards and other consumer debt. See SKEEI., supra note 1, at 188 (table show-






organization that was perceived to be walking away from its responsi-
bilities would be vastly greater. A church's ability to preach to outsid-
ers, and even to minister to its own members, would be seriously un-
dermined if it seemed unwilling to face up to its own problems.
Notice the connection between the morality of bankruptcy from
the church's perspective, on the one hand, and the bankruptcy
stigma, on the other. Each pivots on the church's accountability. Us-
ing bankruptcy to limit a church's responsibility to those who have
been harmed would contradict the church's own teachings; and the
perceived failure to take full responsibility would tarnish the church's
reputation in the world—that is, it would magnify the bankruptcy
stigma.
V. THE CASE FOR BANKRUPTCY
"After the final no," Wallace Stevens wrote in a well-known poem,
"there comes a `yes."61 Like the Stevens poem, this Article has cata-
logued an extensive list of "nos." We have seen a litany of reasons why
religious organizations should think twice before filing for bank-
ruptcy. Each of the concerns—the morality of bankruptcy, the risk
that the filing will be kicked out, the implications of bankruptcy for
church assets, the intrusion of bankruptcy oversight—is both legiti-
mate and real. But under carefully limited conditions, a bankruptcy
filing might make sense. There is a case for bankruptcy, a "yes," and I
will conclude this Article by attempting to make it.
The key issue is the one arrived at last: accountability. Unless it
soinehow reflected a commitment to those who have been harmed, a
church's Chapter 11 filing would not be morally defensible. I should
emphasize that the victims we need to focus on first are the immedi-
ate victims of clergy sexual misconduct. One sometimes hears the ar-
gument that the Church needs to file for bankruptcy, and to scale
down its liability to these victims, so that it will have sufficient financial
resources to help others who are in need elsewhere." The Church's
continued capacity for ministry is crucially important, but the princi-
An Economic Analysis of Consumer Bankruptcy Law and Bankruptcy Reform, at 5,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=454121
 (2003) ("In 2002 bankruptcy filings for the first time
exceeded 1.5 million; early reports for 2003 indicate a further rise this year.").
61 Wallace Stevens, The We11-Dressed Man with a Beard, in THE COLLECTED POEMS or
WALLACE STEVENS 247 (1954).
62 See Catharine Pierce Wells, Churches, Charities, and Corrective Justice: Making Churches
Pay for the Sins of Their Clergy, 44B.0, L. REV. 1201, 1202-03, 1214-15 (2003).
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pal objective must be to minister to those who have been abused—the
victims.
How, then, can bankruptcy be reconciled with this kind of ac-
countability? The short answer is that a church that files for bank-
ruptcy should commit from the outset to make complete restitution
to every victim of clergy sexual misconduct. Although bankruptcy is
ordinarily used to restructure and reduce the debtor's obligations, it
also can be used to solve related problems, such as coordinating the
debtor's response to a wave of litigation. The obvious analogues to the.
Archdiocese of Boston's situation are the asbestos and other mass tort
bankruptcies to which I alluded earlier. 63
 Although some of the debt-
ors have significantly restructured their liability, the goal of most has
been to set up a mechanism for providing payment to the victims of
the torts in question. The standard strategy for handling these cases is
to establish administrative procedures for determining the extent of
the company's liability to each victim. Payments to the victims are
then made by a trust that is set up for this purpose, and which is usu-
ally funded by a combination of stock, other securities of the debtor,
and cash 64
Some commentators have argued that the best way to handle the
rash of litigation against the Church would be through an administra-
tive process within the Church itself. 65
 If the Church itself processed
the claims, they argue, and demonstrated a commitment to fully
compensating the victims, it could shift out of the current litigation
mode and into a more administrative one; no longer would the
Church be in the awkward position of defending itself with legal ar-
guments that seem to cast doubt on the Church's willingness to accept
responsibility for the misbehavior of some of its priests. An important
benefit of Chapter 11, as demonstrated by the asbestos bankruptcies,
Dalkon Shield litigation, and breast implant litigation, is that it can be
used to achieve precisely the same result.
To be sure, the parties would need to address a variety of com-
pensation-related questions as they set up the fund. Obvious issues
include the question of how to compensate psychological injuries
such as pain and suffering and whether to permit punitive damages.
See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
" The trust fund strategy employed in the In re Johns-Manville Corp. case has now been
enshrined in the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2000) (procedures for trust funds
in asbestos cases); See SK E EL, supra note 1, at 217-18.
415
 Patrick Schiltz, for instance, noted at the Boston College Law School Symposium
that he has made this argument in a variety of contexts in recent years.
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These are difficult issues—although the asbestos cases have excluded
punitive damages, for instance, it is less clear that exemplary damages
should be excluded altogether in this context. 66 Whatever the appro-
priate structure, it will not be put in place unless a majority of the vic-
tims agree to the terms. Under Chapter 11, each class of claims is en-
titled to vote to approve the terms of a proposed restructuring.°
Because the clergy sexual misconduct victims are by far the largest
creditors of the Archdiocese of Boston—which has little other debt—
their votes would determine whether a proposed payout framework
went forward. The success or failure of a proposal would be largely in
the victims' hands.
What about the other concerns we have considered? Each is a
genuine issue, but none would rule out a bankruptcy filing altogether.
If the Archdiocese made clear that it intended to fully compensate all
of the victims, it seems unlikely that a bankruptcy court would throw
the case out as having been filed in bad faith. A generous compensa-
tion framework would make it easier to resolve debates over the re-
sponsibility of other dioceses or the Vatican. The financial scrutiny
that would attend a bankruptcy filing could not be avoided; the Arch-
diocese would be forced to reveal far more about its finances than
ever before. But it is not clear that financial transparency, at least in
this context, is such a bad thing. To confirm that the Archdiocese is
truly committed to compensating the victims, we—and more impor-
tantly, the victims—need to know more about the economic condition
of the Archdiocese.
It is no accident that religious organizations so rarely consider
filing for bankruptcy. Most churches have few creditors, and they de-
pend almost entirely on the regular tithes and offerings given by their
congregations for support. If the congregation is too small to sustain
the church, the church simply relocates or closes. The clergy sexual
misconduct scandal is a dramatic exception to this pattern because of
the enormous wave of liability that has come with it. Unlike other
churches or church entities, several archdioceses and dioceses sud-
denly have an unprecedented amount of potential debt. Bankruptcy
is generally viewed as a way to walk away from one's debt, but bank-
ruptcy need not always have this effect. Rather than disavowing a
66
 For a criticism of the linntations placed on damages in A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin,
see, for example, RICHARD B. SoR01., BENDING 11IE LAW: TIIE STORY Or 'nit: DALKoN
SHIELD BANKRUPTCY 197-208 (1991).
67
 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (approval of a majority in number and two-thirds in amount consti-
lutes approval by a class of creditors).
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church's liability to victims of clergy sexual misconduct, bankruptcy
could also be used as a context for paying them—for confirming the
church's accountability rather than undermining it.
